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Abstrat
Barrett, Hardy, and Kent have shown in 2005 that protools for quantum key agree-
ment exist the seurity of whih an be proven under the assumption that quantum or
relativity theory is orret. More preisely, this is based on the non-loal behavior of
ertain quantum systems, ombined with the non-signaling postulate from relativity. An
advantage is that the resulting seurity is independent of what (quantum) systems the
legitimate parties' devies operate on: they do not have to be trusted. Unfortunately,
the protool proposed by Barrett et al. annot tolerate any errors aused by noise in
the quantum hannel. Furthermore, even in the error-free ase it is ineient: its om-
muniation omplexity is Θ(1/ε) when foring the attaker's information below ε, even
if only a single key bit is generated. Potentially, the problem an be solved by privay
ampliation of relativisti  or non-signaling  serey. We show, however, that suh
privay ampliation is impossible with respet to the most important form of non-loal
behavior, and appliation of arbitrary hash funtions.
Key words: Devie-independent seurity, quantum key agreement, Bell inequalities,
non-loality, ryptography
1. Introdution, Motivation, and Our Contribution
1.1. What is Relativisti Cryptography?
The seurity of relativisti ryptography an be proven under the sole assumption
that the non-signaling postulate of relativity theory is orret. The latter states that
information transmission faster than at the speed of light is impossible. The basi idea,
as proposed by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [4℄, is as follows: By ommuniation over a
quantum hannel, two parties, Alie and Bob, generate some shared entangled quantum
state. They then an arry out measurements and use an authenti lassial hannel to
determine the resulting orrelation of their respetive data.
So far, this is entanglement-based quantum ryptography as proposed by Ekert [14℄
1
some years after the rst quantum key distribution protool, proposed by Bennett and
1
Interestingly, the title of Ekert's elebrated artile, Quantum ryptography based on Bell's theo-
rem, suits muh more preisely  and might have antiipated in some way  the idea of relativisti
ryptography based on non-loal orrelations: Here, the seurity proof is diretly based on Bell's theorem,
whih is not the ase for Ekert's protool.
Brassard [7℄ that is not based on entanglement at all. Let us quikly follow Ekert's path:
From the orrelations, they onlude on error rates and adversarial information and
generate a key, the seurity of whih an be proven based on the assumption that quantum
physis with all its Hilbert-spae formalism is orret [21℄. An additional assumption that
usually has to be made is that the devies operate on speied quantum systems of given
dimension (e.g., single polarized photons); the seurity is lost when the atual systems
are dierent (e.g., pairs of photons). The question of devie-independent seurity has
been raised already in [1℄. It was shown that under ertain restritions on the type of
possible attaks, namely to so-alled olletive, i.e., i.i.d., attaks, it an be ahievable
at the prie of a lower key-generation rate.
Let us now turn bak to relativisti ryptography : Here, Alie and Bob arry out
measurements on their respetive systems in a spae-like separated fashion (to exlude
signaling), and this will allow them to onlude privay diretly from the orrelations of
their resulting data. The proofs then hold for whatever quantum systems the devies
operate on; no Hilbert spae formalism is used, only lassial information theory. Atu-
ally, the assumption is not even neessary that the possibilities of what an adversary an
do is limited by quantum physis. Quantum physis guarantees the protool to work,
i.e., establishes the expeted orrelations, the ourrene of whih an be veried, but
the seurity is ompletely independent of quantum physis. An interesting onsequene
is that protools an be given whih are seure if either quantum physis or relativity
(or both, of ourse) is orret.
How an it be possible to derive serey from orrelations alone? In quantum physis,
this eet is well-known: Quantum orrelations, alled entanglement, are monogamous
to some extent [23℄. If Alie and Bob are maximally entangled, then Eve must be out of
the piture. But lassially, we do not know suh an eet: If Alie and Bob have highly
orrelated bits, Eve an nevertheless know them. The point is that we have to look at
orrelations of systems, i.e., bipartite input-output behaviors.
John Bell has proven in 1964 [5℄ that entangled quantum states an display non-loal
orrelations under measurements. More preisely, the system onsists of the hoie of
the partiular measurement to be arried out  the inputs  and the orresponding
outomes  the outputs. Bell's work was a reply to Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's
laim [13℄ that quantum physis was inomplete and should be augmented by lassial
variables determining the behavior of every system under any possible measurement. Bell
proved that suh a thing is impossible: these variables do not exist. This is what an
be exploited ryptographially: If they do not exist, then no adversary an have known
them before a measurement was arried out.
We explain this in more detail and start with a loser look at systems and orrelations.
1.2. Systems, Correlations, and Non-Loality
In order to explain the essene of non-loality, we introdue the notion of two-partite
systems, dened by their joint input-output behavior PXY |UV (see Figure 1). We lassify
systems by the orrelation they introdue and by the resoure required to explain the
joint behavior of its parts.
Denition 1. A system is a bi- (or more-) partite onditional probability distribution
PXY |UV . A system PXY |UV is independent if PXY |UV = PX|U · PY |V . It is loal if
2
PXY |UV
U V
X Y
Figure 1: A two-partite system.
PXY |UV =
∑n
i=1 wiP
i
X|UP
i
Y |V holds for some weights wi ≥ 0 and onditional distri-
butions P iX|U and P
i
Y |V , i = 1, . . . , n. A system is signaling if it allows for message
transmission, i.e., there exist PU and PV suh that I(X ;V |U) > 0 or I(Y ;U |V ) > 0
2
.
We all a non-signaling system a box.
In terms of lassial resoures required to establish them, these ategories orrespond
to no resoures at all, shared information, and message transmission, respetively. Of
interest for us will be systems that are neither loal nor signaling, i.e., non-loal boxes.
Communiation is required to explain their behavior lassially, but for some of them,
distributed quantum information is suient. Note that beause they are non-signaling,
this does not ontradit relativity. We give an alternative haraterization of loality.
Lemma 1. For any system PXY |UV , where U and V are the ranges of U and V , respe-
tively, the following onditions are equivalent:
1. PXY |UV is loal,
2. there exist random variables Xu (u ∈ U) and Yv (v ∈ V) with a joint distribution
that is suh that the marginals satisfy PXuYv = PXY |U=u,V=v.
Proof. Assume rst that PXY |UV is loal, i.e., PXY |UV =
∑
wiP
i
X|UP
i
Y |V . For U =
{u1, u2, . . . , um} and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}, dene
PXu1 ···XumYv1 ···Yvn (x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) :=∑
wiP
i
X|U=u1(x1) · · ·P
i
X|U=um(xm) · P
i
Y |V=v1(y1) · · ·P
i
Y |V=vn(yn) .
This distribution has the desired property.
To see the reverse diretion, let Xu1 · · ·XumYv1 · · ·Yvn be the shared randomness w.
Intuitively speaking, we an simply forget about the inputs, and all the alternative
outputs an be put under the roof of a single joint distribution (see Figure 2).
2
Alternatively, signaling systems an be dened as systems whih are not non-signaling; a non-
signaling system being one for whih
X
x
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) =
X
x
PXY |UV (x, y, u
′, v) for all y, v, u, u′ ,
X
y
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v) =
X
y
PXY |UV (x, y, u, v
′) for all x, u, v, v′
holds. The two denitions are equivalent.
3
PXY |UV
U V
Xu1, ..., Xum Yv1 , ..., Yvn
Figure 2: Loality is realism.
Lemma 1 onnets loality with so-alled realism: All the outputs to the alternative
inputs o-exist  and an, hene, be pre-seleted  in a onsistent way. In other
words, non-loality neessarily means that ertain data do not exist before an input is
provided on the respetive side.
1.3. Non-Loality Implies Serey
In order to explain this more expliitly, let us onsider a spei example of a system.
Denition 2. [20℄ A Popesu-Rohrlih box (or PR box for short) is the following two-
partite system PXY |UV : The random variable X is a random bit, given the pair (U, V ),
and we have
Prob [X ⊕ Y = U · V ] = 1 . (1)
Bell's theorem states that this system is indeed non-loal. More preisely, any system
that behaves like a PR box with probability superior to 75% is. Interestingly, the proba-
bilities oming from measurements on bipartite entangled quantum states  onsidering
the hoie of a measurement as the input and the measurement result as the output 
an ahieve roughly 85%.
Theorem 2. (John Bell, 1964 [5℄.) Any system that behaves like a PR box with
probability > 75% for random inputs is non-loal.
Proof sketh. Lemma 1 states that a system is loal only if the alternative outputs
(i.e., outputs to alternative inputs) onsistently o-exist. In the ase of the PR box, this
orresponds to a joint distribution of four bits PX0X1Y0Y1 suh that Prob [X0 = Y0] =
Prob [X0 = Y1] = Prob [X1 = Y0] = 1 and Prob [X1 6= Y1] = 1 hold. These onditions
are ontraditory: Only three out of the four an be satised at a time. ✷
Note that although in terms of lassial resoures, the behavior of a PR box an be
explained by message transmission only, the system is atually non-signaling: X and Y
separately are perfetly random bits and independent of the input pair. On the other
hand, a system PXY |UV (where all variables are bits) satisfying (1) is non-signaling
only if the outputs are ompletely unbiased, given the input pair, i.e., PX|U=u,V=v(0) =
PY |U=u,V=v(0) = 1/2. In other words, the output bit annot be pre-determined, not
even slightly biased. The outputs are, hene, perfetly random and the randomness
must have been generated after input reeption. This is what we an make use of for
key agreement: Assume that Alie and Bob share any kind of physial system, arry
out spae-like separated measurements (hereby exluding message transmission), and
4
measure data having the statistis of a PR box. (In order to test this, they exhange
all the input bits and some randomly hosen outputs.) The resulting data are then
perfetly seret bits, beause even onditioned on an adversary's omplete information,
the orrelation between Alie and Bob must be non-signaling!
Unfortunately, however, perfet PR boxes do not exist in nature: Quantum physis
is non-loal, but not maximally
3
. Can we still obtain virtually seret bits from weaker,
quantum-physially ahievable, non-loality? Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [4℄ have shown
that the answer is yes ; but their protool is ineient: In order to redue the probability
that the adversary learns a generated bit shared by Alie and Bob below ε, they have to
ommuniate Θ(1/ε) Qbits. Barrett et al.'s protool and its analysis are based on a type
of non-loality dierent from the one modeled by the PR box  the latter is typially
referred to as CHSH [12℄ non-loality.
Masanes and Winter [19℄ proposed to use a number of 85%-approximations to the
PR box (this is ahievable with so-alled singlets, i.e., maximally entangled Qbit pairs)
4
.
Indeed, any, even weak, non-loality implies some serey, but no perfet serey in
general. In order to illustrate this, onsider a system approximating a PR box with
probability 1− ε for all inputs. More preisely, we have
Prob [X ⊕ Y = U · V |U = u, V = v] = 1− ε (2)
for all (u, v) ∈ {0, 1}2. Then, what is the maximal possible bias
p := Prob [X = 0|U = 0, V = 0]
suh that the system is non-signaling?
u PX|U=u,V=v(0) PY |U=u,V=v(0) v
0 p p− ε 0
0 p p− ε 1
1 p− 2ε p− ε 0
1 p− 2ε p− ε 1
We explain the table: Beause of (2), the bias of Y , given U = V = 0, must be at
least p − ε. Beause of non-signaling, X 's bias must be p as well when V = 1, and so
on. Finally, ondition (2) for U = V = 1 implies p − ε − (1 − (p − 2ε)) ≤ ε, hene,
p ≤ 1/2 + 2ε. For any ε < 1/4, this is a non-trivial bound. (This reets the fat that
ε = 1/4 is the loal limit, as we have seen in the proof of Bell's theorem.) If we apply
this, onditioned on Eve's knowledge, we obtain a lower bound on her unertainty whih
is the better the stronger the non-loality is. (A speial ase is what we have seen above
already: maximal CHSH non-loality leads to perfet serey.)
In this paper we onsider privay ampliation applied to the outputs of non-loal
boxes. Privay ampliation is a onept well-known from lassial [8℄, [15℄, [6℄ and
3
It is a fundamental question, studied by many researhers, why this is the ase. Is there a lassial
signiane to the 85%-bound?
4
The analysis of privay ampliation given in the original paper [19℄ led to a result whih seems
to be in ontradition to our laim that privay ampliation is impossible. In the mean-time it has
been realized that the seurity denition used in [19℄ is inomplete and would only be suient if the
adversary had to measure before the hash funtion beomes publi (see [18℄ for a revised version).
5
quantum [16℄ ryptography, and means transforming a weakly seret string into a highly
seret key by hashing. Beause the seurity of privay ampliation ultimately depends
on the abilities of an adversary, seurity in the ontext of an adversary governed by
quantum mehanis [21℄ does not neessarily imply seurity in the ontext of an adversary
only restrited by the non-signaling ondition (modeled by the boxes introdued above).
In this latter ontext, seurity is only known to hold under the additional assumption
that the adversary an only attak eah of the boxes separately [3℄, [22℄, [2℄. In general,
however, an adversary may of ourse attak all of them jointly (orresponding to a
oherent attak
5
). Suh a more general senario has been onsidered by Masanes [17℄
(see also [18℄), where the non-signaling postulate is imposed not only between the dierent
parties, but also between subsystems held by one party. In this ase, privay ampliation
is indeed possible, but this solution requires n devies whih are spae-like separated and
is therefore not pratial. We onsider the general situation where only a spae-like
separation between Alie and Bob is imposed and Eve an make arbitrary attaks.
1.4. Our Result: Ampliation of Relativisti Privay is Impossible
We state our main result informally. We look at the following senario: in a rst
phase Alie and Bob have aess to n realizations of a (1 − ε)-approximation of a PR
box. In a seond phase, they an ommuniate over an authenti but publi lassial
hannel, and apply arbitrary one-bit-output funtions to their data set. We then show
that, for any suh funtion, they an only redue the information that a general non-
signaling adversary an have about the bit, when ompared to the raw bits output by
the boxes, by at most a fator 4. In other words, privay ampliation by hashing is
impossible in the relativisti-ryptography setting.
1.5. Outline
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2, we desribe the general set
of possible strategies of a non-signaling adversary. In Setion 3, we illustrate the power of
a non-signaling adversary by showing that the XOR of n boxes' output bits is not more
seure against a non-signaling attak than a single bit  quite the opposite, in fat.
We also desribe one onrete (good) adversarial strategy, whih allows the adversary to
obtain high information about the key bit. This is a speial ase of our general privay-
ampliation no-go result stated in Setion 4, whih shows that privay ampliation by
any hash funtion is impossible.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Puriation of Bipartite Non-Signaling Systems
6
Assume Alie and Bob share a box. When we take the adversary into aount, we get
a three-partite senario. The goal of this setion is to redue this tripartite senario to
5
In quantum mehanis, three types of attaks  individual, olletive and oherent attaks  are
generally onsidered [11℄, [10℄, [9℄. In an individual attak, the eavesdropper attaks and measures
eah system identially and independently; in a olletive attak the adversary still attaks eah system
identially and independently, but an make a joint measurement; nally the strongest attak is a
oherent attak, where no restritions apply.
6
In quantum mehanis, the puriation of a bipartite state is the extension of the state to a third
party suh that the overall state is pure.
6
a bipartite one: Given the box Alie and Bob share, what is the most general extension
to a third party? This third party will take the role of the adversary.
Aording to the non-signaling assumption, even the three-partite senario inluding
the eavesdropper must not allow for signaling. For instane, we have
7 P (xy|uvw) =
P (xy|uv) and P (x|u) = P (x|uv), and so on.
PXY Z|UVW
U V
X Y
W Z
Alie Bob
Eve
Figure 3: The three-partite senario inluding the eavesdropper.
Note that beause of the non-signaling property, the marginal box (in the very same
sense as a marginal probability distribution) of Alie and Bob is well-dened: Their
input-output statistis do not depend on what the adversary does, i.e., inputs.
The marginal system PXY |UV orresponds to a box. We will use the notation X (Y ,
U , V ) for binary random variables, boldfae letters X for n-bit random variables and Xi
for the i'th random bit. The values that the random variable take will be denoted by
lower-ase letters. Note that onsidering only a single box inludes the ase where Alie
and Bob share many boxes, beause these an be seen as one box as long as Alie and
Bob eah give all their inputs simultaneously
8
. Eve an then attak all these boxes at
one through a single input/output interfae. This is analoguos to an Eve being apable
of doing olletive attaks in quantum key distribution. Eve's random variablesW and Z
an have any range. Eve's input w orresponds to the hoie of her strategy. In general,
we must assume that Eve an delay her hoie until all other parameters are known. In
an informal way, we an write Eve's possibilities as
A B = p(z0|w) · A B
z0
+ p(z1|w) · A B
z1
+ . . .
= p(z′0|w
′) · A B
z′
0
+ p(z′1|w
′) · A B
z′
1
+ . . .
Eve's strategy w orresponds to a deomposition of Alie's and Bob's box. Her
measurement result z tells her whih part of the deomposition ourred.
7
For the sake of simpliity, we drop indies that name the random variables when they are obvious.
8
More preisely, Alie gives all her inputs at a given point in spae-time and likewise for Bob
7
Denition 3. A box partition
9
of a given box P
XY|UV is a family of pairs (pz,P z
XY|UV),
where pz is a weight and P z
XY|UV is a box, suh that
P
XY|UV =
∑
z
pz · P z
XY|UV . (3)
Beause of the non-signaling ondition, the marginal distribution of Alie and Bob must
be the same, no matter Eve's strategy. The fat that any two parties annot signal to
the third party (for example, Alie and Eve together annot signal to Bob) implies that
every box dened by the behavior of the box shared by Alie and Bob onditioned on
an outome z, P
XY|UV,W=w,Z=z, must be non-signaling. This is, therefore, the most
general way to desribe a valid strategy of Eve as stated by the following lemmas.
Lemma 3. For any given tripartite box P
XYZ|UVW any input w indues a box partition
parametrized by z: pz := p(z|w), P z
XY|UV := PXY|UV,Z=z,W=w.
Lemma 4. Given a bipartite box P
XY|UV let W be a set of box partitions
w = {(pz, P z
XY|UV)}z .
Then the tripartite box, where the input of the third part is w ∈ W, dened by
P
XYZ|UV,W=w(z) := pz · P z
XY|UV
is non-signaling and has marginal box P
XY|UV.
From now on, w will stand for a ertain box partition, i.e., an adversarial strategy.
We are interested in the question: Whih type of box, given outome z, an our with
what probability pz? Let us show that in order to answer this question, it is enough to
look at the ase where Eve only has two possible measurement outomes z0 and z1, as
all other outomes an be wrapped into a single one. The reason is that the spae of
non-signaling boxes is onvex. We have
A B = pz0 · A B
z0
+ pz
′
1 · A B
z′
1
+ · · ·+ pz
′
m · A B
z′
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
pz1 · A B
z1
where pz1 = pz
′
1 + . . .+ pz
′
m
.
Lemma 5. If (pz0 , P z0
XY|UV) is an element of a box partition with m elements, then it is
also an element of a box partition with only two elements.
9
This is analogous to quantum mehanis, where bipartite states are desribed by density operators
ρAB and where any measurement on a purifying system orresponds to a partition of the form ρAB =P
z p
zρzAB , where ρ
z
AB is the state onditioned on the measurement outome z.
8
Proof. We dene the probability of outome z1 as p
z1 = pz
′
1 + · · ·+pz
′
m
and the box given
outome z1 as
P z1
XY|UV :=
1
pz1
m∑
i=1
pz
′
iP
z′
i
XY|UV .
The marginal distribution dened in this way is the one expeted by Alie and Bob
beause of
pz0P z0
XY|UV + p
z1P z1
XY|UV = p
z0P z0
XY|UV +
m∑
i=1
pz
′
iP
z′
i
XY|UV = PXY|UV .
It remains to show that P z1
XY|UV is a valid non-signaling probability distribution. The
onvex ombination of several probabilities is again a probability between 0 and 1 and
the normalization remains beause every part is normalized separately. The distribution
is non-signaling beause every single part is (the non-signaling property is linear). There-
fore, P z1
XY|UV is a valid non-signaling probability distribution, and the two outomes z0
and z1 dene a box partition.
Lemma 5 implies that for showing an impossibility result, we an assume Eve's in-
formation (the random variable Z) to be binary. Moreover, we will now show that it is
not neessary to determine both parts of the box partition expliitly, but we an nd
a ondition on the box given outome z = 0, whih will make sure that there exists a
seond part, omplementing it to a box partition.
Lemma 6. Given a non-signaling distribution P
XY|UV, there exists a box partition with
element (p, PZ=0
XY|UV) if and only if for all inputs and outputs x,y,u, v,
p · PZ=0(xy|uv) ≤ P (xy|uv) . (4)
Proof. The onvex ombination of boxes PZ=z
XY|UV is again a box. To prove that the
outome z = 0 an our with probability p it is, therefore, needed to show that there
exists another valid outome z = 1 whih an our with probability 1 − p, and that
the weighted sum of the two is P
XY|UV. If PZ=0
XY|UV is a normalized and non-signaling
probability distribution, then so is PZ=1
XY|UV, beause the sum of the two PXY|UV is also
non-signaling and normalized. Therefore, we only need to verify that all entries of the
omplementary box PZ=1
XY|UV are between 0 and 1. However, this box is the dierene
PZ=1
XY|UV =
1
1− p
(P
XY|UV − p · PZ=0
XY|UV) .
Requesting this to be greater or equal to 0 is equivalent to (4). We observe that all entries
of PZ=1
XY|UV are now trivially smaller than or equal to 1 beause of the normalization: if
the sum of positive summands is 1, eah of them an be at most 1.
2.2. Desription of the Senario and Seurity Criteria
We study the senario where Alie and Bob share several approximations of PR
boxes. Alie and Bob an test the behavior of the boxes, but we assume that this has
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already been done, and that the boxes behave exatly as expeted by Alie and Bob;
more preisely, we assume that Alie and Bob share n independent and unbiased PR
boxes with error ε, dened below.
Denition 4. An unbiased PR box with error ε is a system PXY |UV , where X,Y, U, V
are bits, and for every pair (U, V ) X and Y are random bits, and
Prob [X ⊕ Y = U · V ] = 1− ε
(see also (6)).
The marginal box as seen by Alie and Bob an, therefore, be expressed as
P
XY|UV :=
n∏
i=1
PXiYi|UiVi ,
where PXiYi|UiVi is a single unbiased PR box with error ε. This assumption only restrits
Eve's possibilities as ompared to the ase when the marginal is not xed. To reate a
key, Alie and Bob take a publi input and a publi hash funtion f and apply f to
the outomes of the boxes. The quality of the resulting key an be measured by the
distane from the uniform distribution given the adversary's knowledge. In general, the
goal of privay ampliation is to reate a highly seure bit-string. However, the non-
uniformity of the key is lower-bounded by the non-uniformity of a single bit; for showing
the impossibility of privay ampliation, it is, therefore, enough to show that the non-
uniformity of a single bit is always high. (Indeed, if Alie and Bob annot even reate a
single seure bit, they an surely not reate several seure bits.)
Sine in the protool, Bob adjusts his output bit to Alie's after the exhange of their
inputs, it is enough for Eve to know the output of Alie's hashing, f(x). For taking
into aount the most general non-signaling attak, we must assume that Eve an adapt
her strategy to the hoie of f and the inputs. In our ase, it will in fat be suient
for Eve to hoose a strategy with only two outputs, z = 0 and z = 1, eah ourring
with probability 1/2, suh that given z = 0, f(X) is maximally biased towards 0. The
knowledge Eve has about the key bit f(X) an be seen as the non-uniformity of this
bit, given her outome z. Obviously, this quantity depends on Eve's strategy (the box
partition she uses), Alie's and Bob's inputs and the hash funtion that is applied to the
output bits.
Denition 5. The non-uniformity of the bit f(X) given a box partition w and input
u,v is
δfw(u,v) =
1
2
∑
z
pz ·
∣∣∣P z
XY|UV(f(x) = 0|uv)− P
z
XY|UV(f(x) = 1|uv)
∣∣∣ .
Here δfw(u,v) = 0 means that the eavesdropper has no knowledge about the bit f(X);
on the other hand, δfw(u,v) = 1/2 orresponds to omplete knowledge. Our goal will be
to show that the non-uniformity remains high, no matter what funtion Alie (and Bob)
apply to their output bits and how many boxes they share.
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2.3. The Case of a Single Box
In this setion, we will show that the knowledge of a non-signaling adversary about
the outome of a box whih is non-loal is limited, i.e., we onsider the ase where
PXY |UV orresponds to a single unbiased PR box with error ε, and the funtion that is
applied is the identity f = id. This is a more detailed justiation for the laim already
made in Setion 1.3, whih also shows that the bound given there is tight. The marginal
probability distribution as seen by Alie and Bob is given by
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
V
U
0 1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Y
X
0 1 0 1
0
0 12 −
ε
2
ε
2
1
2 −
ε
2
ε
2
1 ε2
1
2 −
ε
2
ε
2
1
2 −
ε
2
1
0 12 −
ε
2
ε
2
ε
2
1
2 −
ε
2
1 ε2
1
2 −
ε
2
1
2 −
ε
2
ε
2
(5)
The riteria that Alie annot signal to Bob translates in this notation to the requirement
that the probabilities in the light gray and dark gray areas are equal (and similarly for the
other rows); that Bob annot signal to Alie is expressed as the same kind of ondition
on the olumns. The normalization riteria is that the probabilities within a double line
must sum up to one.
As an example, we assume that the input bits of Alie and Bob were (u, v) = (0, 0); for
symmetry reasons it is lear that Eve has an equivalent strategy also for all other inputs.
As shown in [24℄, the strategy giving maximal information about a bit to Eve is to hoose
a box partition with three outputs z = {0, 1, δ} suh that if she obtains z = 0 she knows
with ertainty that Alie's bit x is 0 and if she obtains δ Alie's bit is a random bit.
PXY |UV = pZ=0PZ=0XY |UV + p
Z=δPZ=δXY |UV + p
Z=1PZ=1XY |UV ,
where PZ=0(x = 0|u = 0, v = 0) = 1 and PZ=1(x = 1|u = 0, v = 0) = 1. From the fat
that the marginal box of Alie and Bob is unbiased, we an onlude pZ=0 = pZ=1.
Using this box partition, the non-uniformity of the bit X is given by δidw (0, 0) =
1/2(pZ=0 + pZ=1) = pZ=0. However, beause of the onvexity of the theory, we an
easily dene another box partition w′ with only two outomes, z′ = 0 and z′ = 1, whih
also reahes this maximal non-uniformity by equally distributing the seond (δ) outome
into the two others:
PXY |UV = pZ
′=0PZ
′=0
XY |UV + p
Z′=1PZ
′=1
XY |UV ,
where pZ
′=0 = pZ
′=1 = 1/2 and
PZ
′=0
XY |UV = 2p
Z=0PZ=0XY |UV + (1 − 2p
Z=0)PZ=δXY |UV .
We, therefore, only have to nd the box that is maximally biased towards 0 and whih
an our with probability 1/2. Aording to (4), this turns into a simple maximization
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problem under linear onstraints. The result an be written as follows (where the dierent
entries of the table are PZ=0XY |UV ):
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
V
U
0 1
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Y
X
0 1 0 1
0
0 12 + ε 0
1
2 ε
1 ε 12 − 2ε 0
1
2 − ε
1
0 12 + ε 0 ε
1
2
1 ε 12 − 2ε
1
2 − ε 0
(6)
This box has a bias of 2ε towards 0: We have PZ
′=0(X = 0) = 1/2+2ε, whih means that
the non-uniformity of Alie's output bit given box partition w′ is bounded by δidw′(0, 0) =
PZ
′=0(X = 0)−1/2 = 2ε. This implies that in the ase ε = 0.25, Eve an perfetly know
Alie's output bit  whih orresponds to our expetation sine ε = 0.25-boxes an be
simulated with a loal hidden-variable theory, and Eve ould know the hidden variable.
Additionally, for any non-loal theory (i.e., ε < 0.25), the non-signaling ondition bounds
the knowledge of a potential adversary; with perfet PR boxes, one perfetly seret bit
per use is reated, the ondentiality of whih relies only on the non-signaling ondition,
as we have explained in Setion 1.3.
3. Impossibility of Privay Ampliation by Linear Hashing
In this setion, we show that privay ampliation by applying a linear funtion 
taking the XOR of some subset of the output bits  is impossible. Moreover, we will
show that the more bits we take the XOR of, the more Eve an know. At the same time
we try to give a more intuitive explanation of the possibilities Eve has, and explain why
the strategy we give is atually a good strategy for Eve. The spei box partition we
dene here will also be used later in the ase of general hash funtions.
3.1. Intuitive Presentation of the Argument
Let us take as an example the ase where Alie and Bob share only two boxes. Then
we an dene a table with input-output probabilities similar to (5) for the two boxes
PX1X2Y1Y2|U1U2V1V2 . Alie and Bob now have two bits of input and output. As the two
boxes as seen by Alie and Bob are independent, the probabilities are simply the produt
of the input-output probabilities of eah box. We give a part of this table  the part
for the input (u1, u2, v1, v2) = (0, 0, 0, 0):
12
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
V1V2
U1U2 00
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Y1Y2
X1X2 00 01 10 11
00
00
(12 −
ε
2 )· (
1
2 −
ε
2 )·
ε
2 ·
ε
2 · ⇐= row 1
(12 −
ε
2 )
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
ε
2
01
(12 −
ε
2 )· (
1
2 −
ε
2 )·
ε
2 ·
ε
2 ·
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
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ε
2 ·
ε
2 · (
1
2 −
ε
2 )· (
1
2 −
ε
2 )· . . .
(12 −
ε
2 )
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
ε
2
11
ε
2 ·
ε
2 · (
1
2 −
ε
2 )· (
1
2 −
ε
2 )·
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
ε
2 (
1
2 −
ε
2 )
.
.
.
Now, imagine further that Eve learns the input (later, we will see that this is, in fat,
not neessary for her strategy to work), and that the funtion Alie applies is the XOR
(whih is the only non-trivial linear funtion). In the table we mark gray all outomes
for whih Alie's nal bit is 0 and as white the ones where she will get 1. What is
Eve's strategy whih gives her as muh information as possible about Alie's nal bit?
Dening a strategy means onstruting a deomposition of the double box into two parts
orresponding to her two (equally likely) outputs:
A B =
1
2
· A B
z=0
+
1
2
· A B
z=1
In fat, as we have seen before, we only need to onstrut one part PZ=0
XY|UV suh that z =
0 an our with probability 1/2 aording to (4); the seond part is then automatially
dened. As Eve has learned the input 0000 and knows that the funtion Alie applies is
the XOR, we try to make the box given measurement outome z = 0 maximally biased
towards 0, that is, Alie's output bits should be likely to be either 00 or 11. In order
to onstrut the onditional box, given measurement outome z = 0, we start from the
unbiased box as seen by Alie and Bob (given above) and shift around probabilities.
More preisely, we try to take as muh probability as possible out of the white area and
put it into the gray area, therefore, biasing the XOR towards 0. However, we have to
respet a few rules.
1. All entries must remain probabilities between 0 and 1.
2. The normalization of the probability distribution must remain  this will not
be a problem as we only move around probability weights within the same input,
taking them out of one ell and putting them into another.
3. The non-signaling ondition must be satised  this implies that even the input
is known, we must be able to dene the onditional box, given output z = 0, for all
inputs, and it must be possible to do this in a non-signaling way. We will not worry
about this ondition too muh for the moment, as we will be able to show later
that if we proeed as below for all inputs, the box obtained is in fat non-signaling.
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4. There must exist a seond measurement outome z = 1 ourring with
probability 1/2, and suh that the onditional box, given outome z = 1, is also
a valid probability distribution. This box, given outome z = 1, must be able to
ompensate for the shifts in probabilities. Aording to (4), this means that the
entry in every ell must be smaller or equal twie the original entry.
Rules 1 and 4 together state that every new entry must be between 0 and twie the
original entry.
Now, we an proeed row-wise in the piture (a row orresponds to one spei
output on Bob's side) and look at the probabilities in the gray and white areas  i.e.,
the probability for Alie's nal bit to be 0 or 1 respetively. In ase of the rst row
(orresponding to Bob's output y = y1y2 = 00), we see that the probability for Alie
to obtain 00 or 11 is (1/2 − ε/2)2 and (ε/2)2, respetively, and to obtain 01 or 10 is
(1/2 − ε/2)(ε/2) eah. We try to take as muh probability as possible out of the white
area and put it into the gray area. If the sum of probabilities in the white area is smaller
than the one in the gray area, we an take all probability weight out of the white ells
and distribute it in the gray ells proportionally to the original entry. As the white
area is smaller than the gray, this will at most double the gray entries, and all entries
will be within the range allowed by (4). This is the ase here: (1/2 − ε/2)2 + (ε/2)2 >
2(1/2− ε/2)(ε/2), hene, the new entries in the white ells will be 0, and the new entries
in the gray ells will be less than twie the amount that was there before. We will all
rows of this type y> (8), and a generalization of this argument will lead to (13), (14).
The seond row is dierent: The probabilities in the gray area are lower than the
ones in the white area (2(1/2 − ε/2)(ε/2) < (1/2 − ε/2)2 + (ε/2)2), so we annot shift
the entire probability into the gray ells, beause this would more than double the en-
tries. The best we an do is to exatly double the entries in the gray region, and take
exatly this probability (proportionally) out of the white ells, whih means the amount
of probability that is shifted is 2(1/2− ε/2)(ε/2). This type of row will be alled y< (7),
and the (generalized) expression of the new entries is given in (11), (12).
So, whether we look at a row of type y< or y>, the amount of probability that is
shifted is exatly the probability ontained in the area with lower total probability (gray
or white). The shifted probability will orrespond exatly to the bias the box given
outome z = 0 has, so we just have to ount the lower of the two areas on every row.
This is what is said in (18). And this bias is exatly the non-uniformity of the key bit
given box partition w¯. In our example of two boxes and the XOR, the probability shift
(area with the lower probability) happens to be 2(1/2 − ε/2)(ε/2) for every row, and
there are four rows, therefore, δXORexample(00, 00) = 4 ·2(1/2−ε/2)(ε/2) = 2ε−2ε
2
. Finally,
note that if we shift probabilities in this way for all inputs, the resulting box is in fat
non-signaling. The fat that Alie annot signal to Bob is satised beause we do not
shift probabilities between rows. Bob annot signal to Alie beause for every row, the
same row (meaning: with the same sequene of probabilities) appears again for another
input of Bob (maybe just in a dierent position) and the same shifts, therefore, our
for all inputs of Bob.
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3.2. A Conrete (Good) Adversarial Strategy
Now we will dene formally the box partition we desribed informally in the previous
setion. We desribe a box partition w¯ whih ontains an element (1/2, PZ=0
XY|UV), and
whih gives a high non-uniformity of the key bit f(X). Our desription will be rather
general, suh that this box partition an also be used when the funtion f is not the
XOR. The probabilities PZ=0(x,y,u,v) are dened in four ases aording to x, y and
the properties of the box P
XY|UV (in terms of the intuitive explanation above: whether
we are in a white or gray ell, whether there is more probability in the white or the
gray area and aording to the original entry in that ell). For simpliity, let us use the
following notation:
y< :=

y| ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv) <
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)

 , (7)
y> :=

y| ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv) >
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)

 , (8)
x0 := {x|f(x) = 0} , (9)
x1 := {x|f(x) = 1} . (10)
Then PZ=0(xy|uv) is dened as follows:
For all x ∈ x0,y ∈ y< :
PZ=0(xy|uv) := 2 · P (xy|uv) . (11)
For all x ∈ x1,y ∈ y< :
PZ=0(xy|uv) :=
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)−
∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv)∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)
· P (xy|uv) . (12)
For all x ∈ x0,y ∈ y> :
PZ=0(xy|uv) :=
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv) +
∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv)∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv)
· P (xy|uv) . (13)
For all x ∈ x1,y ∈ y> :
PZ=0(xy|uv) := 0 . (14)
Lemma 7. There exists a box partition with an element (pZ=0 = 1/2, PZ=0(xy|uv)).
Proof.
Alie annot signal to Bob:
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For all u,v and y ∈ y<:∑
x
PZ=0(xy|uv) =
∑
x|f(x)=0
2 · P (xy|uv) + (15)
∑
x|f(x)=1
∑
x'|f(x')=1
P (xy|uv)−
∑
x'|f(x')=0
P (xy|uv)∑
x'|f(x')=1
P (xy|uv)
· P (xy|uv)
= 2
∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv) +
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)−
∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv)
=
∑
x
P (xy|uv) =
1
2n
.
For all u,v and y ∈ y>:∑
x
PZ=0(xy|uv) =
∑
x|f(x)=1
0 (16)
+
∑
x|f(x)=0
∑
x'|f(x')=1
P (xy|uv) +
∑
x'|f(x')=0
P (xy|uv)∑
x'|f(x')=0
P (xy|uv)
· P (xy|uv)
=
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv) +
∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv) =
1
2n
.
Bob annot signal to Alie: For this, we need the fat that
P (xy|uv') = P (xy'|uv) ,
where the i'th bit of y' is dened as y′i := yi ⊕ ui · (v
′
i − vi) and, therefore, we have for
all x,u,v: ∑
y
PZ=0(xy|uv') =
∑
y'
PZ=0(xy'|uv) =
∑
y
PZ=0(xy|uv) . (17)
Normalization: This follows diretly from (15), (16):
∑
x,y
PZ=0(xy|uv) =
∑
y
(∑
x
PZ=0(xy|uv)
)
=
∑
y
1
2n
= 1 .
pZ=0 = 1/2: For the ase p = 1/2 (4) translates to PZ=0(xy|uv) ≤ 2 · P (xy|uv), whih
is satised due to the denition of PZ=0(xy|uv).
We an dene a omplementary box PZ=1(xy|uv) = 2 · P (xy|uv) − PZ=0(xy|uv),
to give a box partition
P
XY|UV =
1
2
PZ=0(xy|uv) +
1
2
PZ=1(xy|uv) .
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The bias of the bit f(X) for the box PZ=0
XY|UV and, therefore, also δ
f
w¯(u,v) is given by
δfw¯(u,v) =
∑
y
min

 ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv),
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)

 , (18)
3.3. The Impossibility Result
We will now show that Alie annot use any linear funtion  XOR of some of her
output bits  to do privay ampliation. There always exists a box partition (namely
w¯) suh that the non-uniformity of the key bit given w¯ is bigger than ε, the error of
the box: δfw(u,v) ≥ ε. Furthermore, taking the XOR of many output bits is atually
ounter-produtive, as the non-uniformity of the key bit grows in the number of bits the
XOR is taken of, and in the limit of large n, Eve an even have lose-to-perfet knowledge
about Alie's nal bit.
Lemma 8. For all linear hash funtions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the non-uniformity of the
bit f(X) given box partition w¯ is larger than ε: δfw¯(u, v) ≥ ε.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5
ε
δw
XOR
1 box
2 boxes
3 boxes
4 boxes
5 boxes
Figure 4: The lower bound on the non-uniformity of the nal bit (XOR of all outputs) as
given by (19) as funtion of number of boxes and error. Note that the non-trivial region
of ε is below 0.25.
Proof. If the funtion f is the XOR, we an expliitly determine the non-uniformity of
the bit f(X) given the box partition w¯. In fat, we have either∑
x|⊕ixi=0
P (xy|uv) =
(
n
n
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n
+
(
n
n− 2
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−2 (ε
2
)2
+
(
n
n− 4
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−4 (ε
2
)4
+ ...
∑
x|⊕ixi=1
P (xy|uv) =
(
n
n− 1
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−1 (ε
2
)1
+
(
n
n− 3
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−3 (ε
2
)3
+ ...
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or vie versa. Therefore,
δXORw¯ (u,v) =
∑
y
min
{(
n
n
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n
+
(
n
n− 2
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−2 (ε
2
)2
+ ...,
(
n
n− 1
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−1 (ε
2
)1
+
(
n
n− 3
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−3 (ε
2
)3
+ ...
}
=
∑
y
((
n
n− 1
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−1 (ε
2
)1
+
(
n
n− 3
)(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−3 (ε
2
)3
+ ...
)
=
n/2∑
i=1
(
n
n− (2i− 1)
)
(1− ε)
n−(2i−1)
ε2i−1 , (19)
whih is larger than ε for all n > 1, and shows that there exists a onstant lower bound on
the knowledge Eve an always obtain about the key bit by using this strategy. Further-
more, at the limit of large n, the non-uniformity of the bit f(X) tends toward 1/2 and
Eve an have almost perfet knowledge about Alie's output bit, no matter the original
error of the box.
4. Impossibility of Privay Ampliation by Any Hashing
In this setion, we look at the ase where Alie and Bob apply any funtion of their
hoie to their output bits. First we will show that by using the box partition w¯ dened
in Setion 3.2, Eve an gain the same knowledge for a given funtion, no matter what
the input of Alie and Bob was. This property will make the argument simpler, as it will
be suient to look at the non-uniformity of the bit f(X) for the all-0 input.
Lemma 9. The non-uniformity of the bit f(X) onditioned on the box partition w¯ dened
in Setion 3.2 is independent of the values of u, v, i.e., δfw¯(u, v) = δ
f
w¯.
Proof. Let us rst express the probability of the output x,y, given input u,v, as a
funtion of the probabilities given the 0-input.
P (xy|uv) =
(
1
2
−
ε
2
)(P
i
1⊕xi⊕yi⊕ui·vi)
·
(ε
2
)(P
i
xi⊕yi⊕ui·vi)
= P (xy'|0...0) ,
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where we have again dened y′i = yi ⊕ ui · vi. Therefore,
δfw¯(u,v) =
∑
y
min

 ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|uv),
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|uv)


=
∑
y'
min

 ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy'|0...0),
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy'|0...0)


=
∑
y
min

 ∑
x|f(x)=0
P (xy|0...0),
∑
x|f(x)=1
P (xy|0...0)


= δfw¯(0...0, 0...0) .
Hene, we only have to nd a lower bound on the non-uniformity δfw¯(0...0, 0...0), whih
we an expliitly write as
δfw¯(0...0, 0...0) =
∑
y
min

 ∑
x|f(x)=0
(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−dH(x,y)
·
(ε
2
)dH(x,y)
,
∑
x|f(x)=1
(
1
2
−
ε
2
)n−dH(x,y)
·
(ε
2
)dH(x,y) .
Before we ontinue, we have to introdue some basi fats about orrelations:
We will use the following expression for the distane from uniform of a random bit
X :
δ(PX , PU ) = max(PX(0), PX(1))−
1
2
.
The orrelation cXY between two random bits X and Y is the probability for the two
bits to be equal, minus the probability for the two bits to be dierent
cXY = P (X = Y )− P (X 6= Y ) .
Two equal random bits have orrelation 1 and are alled ompletely orrelated, two ran-
dom bits whih are always dierent have orrelation −1 and are alled ompletely anti-
orrelated.
Let us further notie here the following: Assume Alie has a random bit-string X
to whih she applies a publi funtion f to obtain a single bit: f : X → {0, 1}. Bob
has a random bit-string Y whih is orrelated with X and he would like to alulate
a bit Z that is highly orrelated with f(X). Then the best ahievable orrelation is
coptZf(X) = 2Ey[max(P (f(X) = 0|Z = z), P (f(X) = 1|Z = z))] − 1, and it is reahed by
hoosing Z to be 0 (respetively 1) if f(X) is more likely to be 0 (1) given the information
Y.
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Denition 6. Assume a random variable X, whih is mapped to a bit f(X) ∈ {0, 1},
and a random variable Y giving some information about the value of X. The maximum
likelihood funtion g of f(X) given Y is the funtion g : Y→ {0, 1} dened as
g(y) =
{
0 if P (f(X) = 0|Y = y) ≥ P (f(X) = 1|Y = y)
1 if P (f(X) = 0|Y = y) < P (f(X) = 1|Y = y) .
With these denitions, we an now show the key lemma for the derivation of our
result. It states that Eve an always obtain knowledge proportional to the error in
orrelation between Alie's and Bob's key bit.
Lemma 10. There exists a box partition w suh that δfw = 1/2− 1/2 · cf(X)g(Y), where
f, g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and where g is the maximum likelihood funtion of f(X) given Y.
Proof. It sues to show that the box partition w¯ given in Setion 3.2 (see (18)) reahes
this bound:
δ
f
w¯ =
1
2n
X
y
min
8<
:
X
x|f(x)=0
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y),
X
x|f(x)=1
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y)
9=
;
= 1−
1
2n
X
y
max
8<
:
X
x|f(x)=0
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y),
X
x|f(x)=1
(1− ε)n−dH(x,y) · εdH(x,y)
9=
;
= 1− E
y
[max(P (f(X) = 0|Y = y), P (f(X) = 1|Y = y))] .
However, the last line is exatly equal to 1/2− 1/2 · cf(X)g(Y), where g is the maximum
likelihood funtion of f(X) given Y.
This means that unless Bob is able to reate an output bit whih is highly orrelated
with Alie's, the adversary an always obtain knowledge about the key bit. However, if
Alie just applies the trivial funtion mapping all outputs to zero, then the orrelation
between Alie's and Bob's output bit ould beome 1, and this bound beomes trivial.
We will now show that this does not help beause in order to obtain a high orrelation,
Alie and Bob need to apply a biased hash funtion, and in that ase the adversary an
obtain high knowledge as well.
The following theorem, proven by Yang [25℄, shows the trade-o between randomness
and orrelation of two random bits.
Theorem 11 (Yang [25℄). Suppose that Alie and Bob share n uniformly random bits
with orrelation 1 − 2ε. Then the maximal orrelation that an be reahed if Alie and
Bob both loally apply a funtion f (and g, respetively) to their n original bits is 1 −
2ε(1− 4δ2), where δ := max(δ(Pf(X), PU ), δ(Pg(Y), PU )).
Lemma 10 shows that if δ is small, then Eve's knowledge is high. We now need to
see whether we an lower-bound Eve's knowledge for the ase of large δ. For δ to be
large, either δ(Pf(X), PU ) or δ(Pg(Y), PU ) needs to be large. Let us rst show that if
δ(Pf(X), PU ) is large, then so is Eve's knowledge about f(X). But this is easy, as the
non-uniformity of the bit f(X) is automatially also a lower-bound on the non-uniformity
of f(X) as seen from Eve's point of view; i.e., if the key bit is biased, then an adversary
has a priori information about it. This is stated in Lemma 12.
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Lemma 12. There exists a box partition w suh that the non-uniformity of the bit f(X)
is at least δ(Pf(X), PU ), i.e., δ
f
w ≥ δ(Pf(X), PU ).
Proof. This bound an be obtained by the trivial box partition:
δfno partition(u,v) =
1
2
· |P (f(X) = 0|uv)− P (f(X) = 1|uv)| = δ(Pf(X), PU ) .(20)
We, therefore, found a seond bound on the non-uniformity of the bit f(X) given
w: δfno partition ≥ δ(Pf(X), PU ). It remains to exlude the ase that δ is large beause
δ(Pf(X), PU ) is small and δ(Pg(Y), PU ) is large.
Lemma 13. There exists a box partition w suh that the non-uniformity of the bit f(X)
is at least the absolute value of the dierene between δ(Pf(X), PU ) and δ(Pg(Y), PU ), i.e.,
δfw ≥ |δ(Pg(Y), PU )− δ(Pf(X), PU )|.
Proof. It is enough to show that the box partition w¯ reahes this bound. Note that when
|δ(Pg(Y), PU ) − δ(Pf(X), PU )| is large, then the orrelation between the bits f(X) and
g(Y) must be low:
cf(X)g(Y) = 2 · P (f(X) = g(Y))− 1
≤ 2(1− |δ(Pg(Y), PU )− δ(Pf(X), PU )|)− 1
= 1− 2|δ(Pg(Y), PU )− δ(Pf(X), PU )| .
Using Lemma 10, we an onnet the orrelation with the non-uniformity of f(X) given w¯:
|δ(Pg(Y), PU )− δ(Pf(X), PU )| ≤
1
2
−
1
2
cf(X)g(Y) = δ
f
w¯ .
Using Lemma 12 and 13, we an now onnet the non-uniformity of the bit f(X)
with δ:
Lemma 14. For every hash funtion f , there exists a box partition w suh that δfw ≥
1/2 · δ, where δ := max(δ(Pf(X), PU ), δ(Pg(Y), PU )) and g is the maximum likelyhood
funtion of f(X) given Y.
Note that the box partition w an depend on the hoie of hash funtion f beause
the adversary an delay the hoie of w.
Proof. Lemmas 12 and 13 show that
δfno partition ≥ δ(Pf(X), PU )
δfw¯ ≥ δ(Pg(Y), PU )− δ(Pf(X), PU ) .
This implies diretly that there exists a suitable box partition (either w¯ or the trivial
one) suh that δfw ≥ 1/2 ·max(δ(Pg(Y), PU ), δ(Pf(X), PU )) = 1/2 · δ.
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Figure 5: The lower bound on the non-uniformity of the nal bit as funtion of the error
of the boxes ε.
Now we an put all the previous lemmas together to obtain a general lower bound on
the adversary's knowledge.
Theorem 15. For every hash funtion f , there exists a box partition w suh that the
non-uniformity of the bit f(X) given w is at least −1+
√
1+64ε2
32ε .
Proof. Lemmas 10 and 14 show that
δfw ≥ 1/2 · δ
δfw¯ ≥ 1/2− 1/2 · cf(X),g(Y) ≥ ε(1− 4δ
2) ,
where δ := max(δ(Pf(X), PU ), δ(Pg(Y), PU )). Therefore, δ
f
w¯ ≥ max(1/2 · δ, ε(1 − 4δ
2)),
whih takes its lowest value for 1/2 · δ = ε(1− 4δ2), namely 1/2 · δ = −1+
√
1+64ε2
32ε .
Note that for small ε, this lower bound atually gives a value of δfw lose to 2ε; for ε
lose to 0.25, it is still larger than ε/2. We obtain a onstant lower bound (see Fig. 5)
depending only on the error of the individual boxes ε but not on the number of boxes
n. This shows that the non-uniformity of the bit f(X), given w, an never beome
negligible in the number n of boxes, and, therefore, privay ampliation of relativisti
ryptography is impossible.
5. Conluding Remarks
Cryptographi seurity an be proven only if ertain assumptions are made. This
an be a limitation on the adversary's omputing power, memory spae, or aessible
information. Another example is quantum ryptography, whih is based on the au-
ray and ompleteness of the quantum-physial desription of nature. Although this
theory has been tested by a great number of experiments, it may be attrative to have
an alternative, and to base ryptographi seurity on the fat that quantum or relativity
theory is orret. An additional advantage  and more important in pratie  of suh
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non-signaling shemes, rst proposed by Barrett, Hardy, and Kent [4℄, over traditional
quantum ryptography, going bak to Bennett and Brassard [7℄ as well as Ekert [14℄, is
that the seurity is devie-independent : Alie and Bob do not have to trust the man-
ufaturer of the devies or, more preisely, in the fat that they are atually operating
on the quantum systems they are supposed to be. They an derive the seurity diretly
from the orrelations in their lassial data.
Unfortunately, it appears that suh seurity annot be ahieved this way unless the
physial systems are noiseless and the ommuniation omplexity is exponential in any
reasonable seurity parameter (as it is the ase for Barrett et al.'s protool). Indeed,
we have shown that one of the key ingredients for obtaining unonditional lassial as
well as quantum key agreement eiently, namely privay ampliation, fails here. In
this light, it may be even more surprising that general quantum privay ampliation
is possible [16℄. In partiular, note that our impossibility result holds even for the ase
of olletive attaks, for whih the possibility of devie-independent seurity has been
shown [1℄. An obvious open question is whether privay ampliation ould be made
possible by enforing a time-like ordering between the n systems and therefore imposing
a non-signaling ondition in one diretion. Physially, this would be easily realizable by
measuring several quantum systems one after another.
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